Change in the ex-USSR
In the Wake of the August Coup
By Lynda L. Maillet and Steven J. Norton

Editor's Note: The following article was drafted immediately after the August coup in the former USSR, and was aimed at outlining some of the implications of the coup's failure for our understanding of politics in the region and for the possibilities for Western investment. The authors were not asked to revise the piece in view of the changes since the end of the USSR on Christmas Day, 1991; we felt that the article should stand on its own. Instead, the authors provide a short afterword reflecting on the changes since year end.

The Soviet Union has been undeniably changed by the dramatic events of 19-21 August 1991. The attempted hard-line coup against the Gorbachev government seemed to jeopardize all the accomplish merits of the previous six years in politics and economics. The failure of the coup not only gave hope to the Soviet people and people around the world, but it leaves us lessons to which observers interested in the Soviet Union might pay heed.

Though the events of the coup and its eventual failure will not be sorted out for some time yet, we may find three results of the events that tell us much about the USSR today:

- The first concerns the popular reaction to the coup. Contrary to the expectations of many observers, and apparently of the coup leaders themselves, the Soviet people were not cowed into submission by decrees, curfews, and tanks in the streets. Nor were they willing, by and large, to trade democratization and openness for the coup leaders' vague promises of economic improvement. Citizens, especially in large cities, organized to protest the "emergency committee's" actions and to try to protect the democratically elected governments of their cities and republics. The most visible was the standoff outside the Russian Republic parliament building in Moscow. Many did their best to dodge the restrictions on the news media and to inform their countrymen; others organized protest strikes. Of course, the fervor to oppose the junta was not spread universally, and many analysts make convincing arguments that the coup leaders' failure to bring the bulk of the military with them doomed the success of the putsch (more below). Nevertheless, from its actions the junta expected much greater popular support (or at least acquiescence) than they received....

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